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The traditional approach to sound symbolism: a review 
Ferdinand  de  Saussure,  a  Swiss  linguist  and  founder  of  European 
structuralism,  in  his  linguistic  theory  established  a  number  of  dichotomies 
pertaining to different aspects of language, e.g., langue vs. parole, synchrony 
vs. diachrony, syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic, form vs. substance, and signifé 
vs. signifiant.
1 According to Saussure (see Fischer-Jørgensen (1975)), language 
is described as a system of linguistic signs, every sign having a dual structure, 
i.e., every sign consists of a signifé and a signifiant (signified and signifier), or 
sign-content and sign-expression which – in Hjemslev’s nomenclature – means 
that every linguistic sign, every word, has its concept (meaning) and its acoustic 
image (the actual string of sounds). 
It  is  agreed  that  the  relation  between  the  signifé  and  the  signifiant  is 
arbitrary. This means that there is nothing about the English form /kæt/ that 
says it ought to refer to the feline quadruped we know very well, and not to a 
house or a whale. Likewise, the English word tree, its German equivalent Baum 
and French arbre have the same signification, i.e., they refer to the same class of 
objects,  all  three  varying  significantly  in  form  while  none  of  them  naturally 
represents  a tree  or  its  distinctive  properties  (on  this  issue  see, for  example, 
Lyons (1977:100)). McMahon (1994:177) claims that the very theory of arbitrary 
links  between  a  signified  and  a  signifier  made  studies  of  semantic  change 
possible and until that time it was generally believed that every word had its true 
meaning: hence etymology (Greek etymos – ‘true’). Given that the link between 
the signified and the signifier is only arbitrary, either of them may change in the 
 
1  Many  of  these  dichotomies  are  challenged  in  present-day  linguistics  and,  in  particular, 
within the framework of cognitive linguistics. See, for example, Sweetser (1990), Ruhl (1989), 
Kleparski (1996) and Kleparski (1997).  
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course of time. This phenomenon has been extensively studied by a number of 
scholars, for example, Ullmann (1957,1962). 
The  only  commonly  acknowledged  exception  to  the  universality  of  the 
Saussurean image of a linguistic sign is the case of onomatopoeia, which is 
defined in Bolinger (1992:28) as: 
[...] direct  imitation  of a  sound  ‘in  nature’,  whether  it  represents  the  sound  itself  (bang, 
whoosh, cough) or something for which the sound stands (a relationship of metonymy, e.g. cuckoo, 
blast ‘party’, hum ‘be active’, knock ‘summon to door’). 
Understandably,  ideal  imitations  cannot  exist  because  different  languages 
have different phonological systems and onomatopoeic expressions are bound to 
conform  to  these  particular  systems.  Another  characteristic  feature  of 
onomatopoeic  forms,  according  to  McMahon  (1994:85),  is  their  maximal 
iconicity, which is reflected in that [...] onomatopoeias are not affected by sound 
change or analogy [...]; and later he adds that they also are not affected by 
semantic change. As an example of resistance to phonological change McMahon 
(1994) gives the Mid.E. forms pipen ‘the sound produced by chickens’ in which 
the stem was pronounced /pi:p/, and pipe ‘instrument used for smoking’, with the 
same long monophthong. After the completion of the Great Vowel Shift chicks 
still go peep /pi:p/ but smokers put a /paip/ in their mouth. 
Given that we are raising here the issue of iconicity it should be explained at 
once that it is directly connected with onomatopoeia. With reference to iconicity, 
Wescott (1971:416) defines an icon as [...] a non-arbitrary intentional sign – 
that  is,  a  designation  which  bears  an  intrinsic  resemblance  to  the  thing  it 
designates. Iconicity is a very general term and it covers both visual images, like 
￿￿on  toilet  doors,  and  oral/aural  ones  to  which  we  shall  turn  presently, 
especially sound symbolism and onomatopoeia. One should mention here that it 
is  possible  to  distinguish  two  approaches  to  these  notions:  one  lumps  them 
together  and  uses  the  terms  interchangeably  (see,  for  example,  Crystal 
(1987:174)),  and  the  second  –  represented  by  Bolinger  (1992:28)  –  treats 
onomatopoeia as a sub-class of sound symbolism which, in turn, is defined as 
[...] that form of iconicity in which the nature of the sound resembles what the 
sound stands for.  
Another  sub-class  of  sound  symbolism  distinguished  by  Bolinger  is 
phonesthemes which is based on the synesthetic connection between sound and 
sound, sound and size, sound and movement, etc. He seems to duplicate the 
category ‘sound-to-sound’ which either should be included in an onomatopoeia 
sub-class or onomatopoeia should be a category of phonesthemes. The examples 
of sound-to-light relations are words beginning with the gl- cluster such as, for 
example, glitter, glossy, glow, gleam, glimpse, etc.; sound-to-movement relations 
are  exemplified  by  the  sw-  cluster  suggesting  a  smooth,  wide-reaching 
movement, for example, sweep, swell, swarm, swerve, swoop, etc.; the -nt cluster  
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suggesting shortness in words like, for example, bunt, punt, stunt, runt, blunt, 
etc.; the -rl /з:(r)l/ cluster indicating roundness in such words like swirl, curl, 
pearl,  barrel,  roll.  Sound-to-size  or  distance  connection  is  believed  to  exist 
between  close  vowels  (especially  /i/)  and  smallness  or  closeness,  and  open 
vowels (especially /a/) and largeness or farness, for example, slit vs. slot, chip vs. 
chop, wee vs. vast, little vs. large, near vs. far, this vs. that, see vs. saw. Sound-
to-sensation relation is claimed to exist between sn- and sl- clusters which are 
said to convey certain unpleasant associations, e.g., snafu, snake, snarl, sneeze, 
sneer, slime, slither, slug, sloppy. Additionally, the sl- cluster is often claimed to 
have something to do with downwardness, for example, slope, slalom, slack, 
slave, slump, slouch, etc.  
Those  who  adhere  to  this  approach  admit  that  the  phonesthematic 
relationship is not universal and there are clear counterexamples even in one 
system:  big  vs.  small,  Polish  wielki  ‘big’  vs.  mały  ‘small’.  Such  words  as 
gladiator and glucose have nothing to do with light, and the content of the word 
swap implies rather sharp than far reaching movement. For more examples of 
phonesthemes consult Crystal (1987,1995) and Bolinger (1992). Among others, 
Bolinger (1992:28) says: 
Phonesthemes differ from onomatopoeia in being vaguely analysable, and from morphemes in 
not being PRECISELY analysable (such as the un-, -test-, and -ed of untested). 
What  he  means  here  is  that  onomatopoeic  formations  have  amorphous 
structure  and  are treated  as  indivisible entities;  from  that  definition  one  may 
draw  the  conclusion  that  onomatopoeic  expressions  are  on  a  par  with 
monomorphemic words differing only in the first being maximally iconic (the 
form, that is to say phonetic image, stands for the thing signified), the other 
being totally arbitrary. Aside from onomatopoeia and phonesthemes, Bolinger 
(1992:29) distinguishes non-verbal modifications, intonation, and postural sound 
symbolism, falling under the heading ‘primary sound symbolism’ but, because of 
lack of space, they shall be of no concern to us here. What is worth mentioning is 
that Bolinger (1992) highlights off ‘secondary sound symbolism’, in which, he 
admits, the association of words is accidental, though he tries to prove it works.  
Onomatopoeia and sound symbolism revisited 
On the basis of the discussion presented in the previous section one can say 
that the existence of sound symbolism and onomatopoeic words is a truism: it 
seems  so  obvious  that  there  is  nothing  left.  Nevertheless,  we  would  like  to 
consider these phenomena with a more critical eye from a different perspective 
of view. An attempt will be made to prove that sound symbolism in fact does 
not  exist  and  that  the  superficial  similarity  of  forms,  cf.  phonesthemes,  is  
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essentially arbitrary, and that looking for sound symbolism in language implies 
looking for regularities in language which are simply not there to be found. We 
will also try to show that onomatopoeic formations should not be given any 
special status in the theory of language and that the relationship between form 
and meaning in these expressions is nothing less than arbitrary. 
At the outset, we will provide some partial evidence that onomatopoeias are 
affected by sound change or analogy like any other lexical formations and the 
point that they sometimes resist those changes is due to the fact that some forms 
behave unpredictably. Beyond doubt, and despite the Junggergrammatiker, there 
are always exceptions in language. If we consider analogy and sound change: 
some  onomatopoeias  undergo  these  processes  when,  at  the  same  time,  some 
definitely non-onomatopoeic forms do not, e.g., at the very beginning of the 
Mid.E.  period  /h/  was  dropped  in  consonantal  clusters  /hr,  hl,  hn/:  hnacod 
‘naked’,  hringan  ‘ring’,  hlúd  ‘loud’,  the  same  kind  of  /h/  was  lost  in 
onomatopoeias: a horse hnægð, now it ‘neighs’, an ox hlewð then the /h/ was 
lost. In O.E. there were different ways of plural formation and suffixing -s was 
only one of them; then, in order to regularise the system, only one way was 
selected, e.g., O.E. bōc /bo:k/, Mod.E. ‘book’, O.E. bēë /be:t∫/, Mod.E. ‘books’; 
strangely enough, the analogy did not apply to some forms that would hardly be 
called  onomatopoeic  such  as,  for  example,  ox/oxen,  goose/geese,  man/men, 
tooth/teeth or salmon/salmon. An example of onomatopoeic forms following the 
rules of regular sound change may be the sound produced by sheep, which in 
O.E. period would blǽt /blæ:t/ but now they bleat /bli:t/, in the meantime they 
would /ble:t/.
2 Another regular change affected short /u/ which, around the 15
th 
century, had an option to become /Λ/ or to remain /u/ in such words as, for 
example, put, full, butcher, cushion, sugar (all with the vowel /u/) and cut, drug, 
dull, sun, much, fun (with the vowel /Λ/). Surprisingly, in O.E. swine grunað but 
later it decided to grunt /grΛnt/, so a clearly onomatopoeic form having an option 
of  remaining  unaffected  chose  to  undergo  a  phonological  modification. 
Onomatopoeic expressions also underwent other sound changes: an O.E. hund 
(dog) byrcð /bürkð/ with a high mid vowel and now it barks with a low back 
vowel /a:(r)/. All these examples testify to regular behaviour of onomatopoeias 
as far as the phonological change is concerned, i.e. there is nothing inside these 
forms that prevents sound change from operating. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  McMahon  (1994:177)  claims  that  onomatopoeic 
expressions are not affected by semantic change. In the following we will make 
an attempt to prove that the semantic structure of what is commonly known as 
onomatopoeic forms may be altered in an identical way to non-onomatopoeic 
words. In the literature on the subject (see, for example, Kleparski (1986,1990), 
 
2 Factually, the change that took place conformed in every way to a regular sound change on a 
par with such words as, for example, dæd > déd > deed or sæ > sé > sea.  
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Waldron (1979)) there are three traditionally recognised basic semantic changes: 
broadening (extension, widening or generalisation), narrowing (specialisation), 
and  meaning  shift.  We  speak  of  broadening  when  the  meaning  of  a  word 
becomes wider, i.e. when it retains its original meaning and additionally means 
something  else,  e.g.  pipe  originally  meant  a  simple  musical  instrument,  but 
through association with its shape it means now ‘a tube’ (a hollow cylindrical 
body),  or  the  word  picture  used  to  denote  ‘something  painted’  but  with  the 
passage of time it has broadened its meaning to include the sense ‘a photograph’. 
Narrowing of meaning may be illustrated by means of the history of the word 
meat, which originally referred to food in general, not only to edible flesh,
3 or 
garage, which once meant ‘any safe place’ but now is used to denote a building 
for storing or repairing cars. Meaning shift can be exemplified by the semantic 
history of the word silly which originally meant ‘happy’, or Polish kurwa which 
originally  referred  to  an  unmarried  woman  but  now  is  used  in  the  sense  of 
‘whore’, or an emphatic particle used after words which the speaker wants to 
emphasise. 
First,  the  process  of  narrowing  of  meaning  in  onomatopoeias  can  be 
exemplified by Polish gęgać; in the 16
th century it meant ‘of a goose’s sound, 
speak nonsense, or speak through the nose’, now only the first meaning ‘of a 
goose’s sound’ is associated with gęgać: the verb huczeć ‘to make noise’ once 
referred to people, musical instruments, the sea and thunder, etc. Now it is never 
used with reference to people. The verb piać originally meant ‘sing’ while in 
present-day Polish it refers only to the sounds produced by roosters and hens. 
English bray, originally applied to such animals as horses, oxen and deer, while 
in  present-day  English  only  men  and  donkeys  can  bray.  Croon  once  meant 
‘bellow’,  ‘roar’  or  ‘murmur’,  ‘hum  softly’,  but  now  it  means  ‘to  sing 
sentimentally into a closely held microphone’.  
Broadening of meaning in onomatopoeic expressions may be clearly traced 
in a number of Polish forms: pikać, originally ‘of a chick’s sound’, in the course 
of time gained the additional meaning ‘beat lightly (of heart)’;
4 gruchać, which 
originally  described  the  sound  made  by  a  pigeon,  now  also  means  ‘wooing, 
courtship’. 
A change that seems least likely to apply to onomatopoeic forms is meaning 
shift, and yet examples are not sparse: bawl once meant ‘bark, howl’ (of a dog), 
now it is used exclusively in the sense ‘cry, shout loudly’; chuckle in its original 
 
3 The original meaning of meat ‘food’ is petrified in what Kleparski (1996,1997) refers to as 
meeting points between synchrony and diachrony such as, for example, sweetmeat, mincemeat or 
the  proverbial  expression  one  man’s  meat  is  another  man’s  poison  (for  more  examples  see 
Kleparski (1997) and Heller et al. (1993)). 
4 Apart from that there is also an onomatopoeic informally used derivative pikawa used in the 
sense ‘heart’.  
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sense meant exactly the opposite to what it means today: in the 16
th century it 
meant ‘laugh vehemently, openly’ and around 1800 chuckle acquired its present 
meaning ‘to laugh quietly to oneself’; hip – the exclamation at present used to 
begin a cheer or to show approval, was used at first to call to someone or to 
attract  their  attention  (like  the  modern  hey);  the  word  jangle,  ‘ring  a  bell 
sharply’,  went  through  a  number  of  meaning  alterations  until  it  reached  its 
present-day meaning: the original sense of the verb was to ‘chatter’, ‘babble’, 
then it was applied to birds, later it meant ‘to speak harshly’, ‘grumble’, and 
from this usage the meaning ‘to make a discordant noise’ developed and, finally, 
jangle began to refer to bells. Nowadays, it is hard to imagine that jargon could 
have meant anything other than ‘argot’, ‘a special language used by a group’, but 
in fact the noun, in its original sense was used for the twittering or chattering of 
birds. The  Polish  verb  grzechotać, ‘to  rattle’,  evolved  from  krzekotać <  krik 
(Mod.Pol. krzyk) ‘to cry’, ‘shout’.  
The  representative  examples  quoted  above  should  make  it  clear  that 
onomatopoeic expressions are as likely to be affected by semantic changes as 
non-onomatopoeic forms and that there is nothing in onomatopoeias that would 
block or even attenuate the possibility of meaning change; the fact that we do not 
perceive these changes is due to the synchronic point of view of language and 
the  fact  that  linguistic  change  usually  occurs  over  several  generations  of 
speakers. More generally, depending on the nature of linguistic enquiries, the 
synchrony/diachrony  dichotomy  can  either  be  conducive  or  damaging  to 
particular descriptive goals. It seems that what is needed in the case at hand is a 
panchronic point of view because the purely synchronic approach tends to deny 
the relevance of the past to the present altogether (see Kleparski (1997), Ruhl 
(1989)). 
To pursue our ends, we conducted a survey in order to examine to what 
extent ‘onomatopoeic’ expressions merit the epithet, i.e. to what extent do they 
resemble (or not) real sounds of nature. The sounds in question are taken from 
different Indo-European languages such as iha iha (Catalan and Polish), kra kra 
(Italian),  pip  (Danish  and  Swedish),  tok  tok  (Dutch),  i  –  i  –  i  (Catalan  and 
Spanish), guru guru (German), bau bau (Italian), summ summ (Danish, German, 
and Norwegian). The elicitation consists of two parts; having completed the first 
part  the  participants  of  the  test  are  given  the  second.  The  instructions  are 
identical in both parts, that is to say:  
The  italicised  expressions  are  the  sounds  typically  produced  by  various 
animals in various languages. Name those animals. 
 
I. One time when I was walking in the countryside I heard [...]: 
1. iha iha   
2. kra kra   
3. summ summ  
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4. tok tok   
5. i – i – i 
6. guru guru 
7. bau bau 
8. pip 
 
For the second elicitation, although the animals are the same as in the first, 
the context in which they are used is fairly clear; the aim of the second part 
was to check how much context would influence the choice of the animal by 
the person under examination. The contexts are as follows: 
 
II. 1. While walking across the meadow full of flowers I heard [...] (summ summ) 
around me. 
2. When I was visiting Bethlehem I heard [...] (iha iha) when an Arab was 
pulling that obstinate animal. 
3. When I was in the jungle I heard [...] (i – i – i) and saw it dextrously 
jumping from one tree to another. 
4. In the country, my grandmother sprinkles grains of wheat to [...] (tok tok) 
every morning. 
5. In the summer, every morning and evening I hear [...] (kra kra) by the 
pond. 
6. My uncle keeps [...] (guru guru) in the loft of the cowshed. 
7. The most popular pet in Poland is a [...] (bau bau). 
8. Early this morning I was woken up by a [...] (pip) hiding in the branches of 
the tree.  
 
The  test  was  carried  out  on  samples  of  Polish  students  and  university 
graduates. They can all speak at least one foreign language and they have some 
linguistic training, which certainly proved to be of help in performing the task 
given to them. On our part, an attempt was made to select the most obvious and 
self-evident cases of onomatopoeia (the actual sounds produced by animals), in 
which the connection between form and meaning has not been questioned. We 
decided not to choose verbs of ‘onomatopoeic’ action because then the proof 
that  there  are  no  ‘onomatopoeic’  forms  would  be  too  easy  to  demonstrate. 
Consider, for example, the following material: a bird chirps in English, crvkuće 
in  Croatian,  kvittar  in  Swedish;  a  bee  buzzes  in  English,  zuji  in  Croatian, 
mezamzemot in Hebrew, ronzo in Italian, surrar in Swedish; a pig which rokće 
in Croatian, chrumka in Polish, grunts in English and grymtar in Swedish. All 
these forms differ so greatly from one another that it is more than obvious that 
they do not refer to the same actions or describe the same sounds produced by 
one and the same animal.   
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The results of the first part of the survey are summarised below. Correct 
answers are in bold while incorrect in plain letters, the symbol # indicates lack of 
an answer, and the numbers after the words indicate the number of subjects who 
chose a particular answer: 
 
iha iha      donkey 3  horse 17       
kra kra        crow 20       
pip     # 8  bird 3  mouse 2  chick 6  peacock 1   
tok tok  # 6  hen 2  turkey 1  frog 1  woodpecker 9  horse1 
i – i – i    # 13    donkey 3  horse 2    mouse 1  pig 1 
summ summ  # 20           
guru guru  # 8  pigeon 6  turkey 4  rabbit 1   bird 1   
bau bau  # 10  dog 9  cat 1       
 
 
And here are the results of the second part:  
 
summ summ   bee   11  cricket   6  # 3 
iha iha    donkey  19  horse   1   
i – i – i    monkey 20     
tok tok    hen   20     
kra kra    frog   9  crow   11   
guru guru  pigeon   19    # 1 
bau bau  dog   20     
pip  bird   19    # 1 
 
 
As can be observed on the basis of the above results, the contextualised task 
was completed much more successfully: there are 14.4% correct answers in the 
first  part  of  the  questionnaire  and  as  much  as  85.4%  correct  answers  in  the 
second and the results would have been even higher if the contexts in questions 1 
and 5 had been more supportive. Let us now analyse the respective responses: 
the  sound  iha-iha  is  produced  by  both  the  Polish  donkey  and  horse.  The 
overwhelming number of answers giving ‘horse’ (85% in the first section) may 
be attributed to the fact that horse is more popular and deeply rooted in Polish 
reality. In any case, this is a wrong answer but with a context provided as much  
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as 95% got it right. Frogs in Italian make the sound kra-kra and exactly the same 
sound is produced by Polish crows, but bearing in mind that these were Polish 
students’ responses under examination it seems understandable that in the first 
section they uniformly chose the animal with whose sound they are familiar. The 
right animal, however, was completely different and they were not so sure of the 
animal when they were doing the second part of the task: 45% changed their 
minds  and  decided  on  frog  even  though  the  context  was  not  clear  enough. 
Answers to i – i – i, pip and tok-tok in the first part of the survey seem to be 
random: they resemble ‘shots in the dark’ where some responses are correct, 0%, 
15% and 10% respectively, some are wrong, 35%, 45% and 60%, and some are 
missing, 65%, 40% and 30% (the diversity of responses seems to suggest that the 
‘onomatopoeic’  sounds could  mean  almost  anything),  but  in  the second  part, 
where the context is unambiguous, the percentage of correct answers is 95% and 
100% respectively. The number of correct responses to guru guru and bau bau in 
the context-free part is somewhat better (30% and 45% respectively), because 
these expressions resemble in form the generally known Polish gruhu gruhu and 
hau hau, but the percentage of correct answers could still be expected to be 
higher. The second part of the survey was completed almost faultlessly: 95% of 
correct answers for gruhu gruhu and 100% for bau bau. The summ summ form 
seems so abstract for Polish people that they did not even try to provide any 
answer in the first section though bees, which produce this sound, are one of the 
most common and best known insects in Poland and the very form summ summ 
is  present  in  a  number  of  Indo-European  languages  such  as,  for  example, 
Estonian, German, Danish and Norwegian. The supplied context (broad as it is) 
enabled the examined to give some expected and probable answers: 55% were 
correct and 30% missed. 
Discussion 
From the results of the survey one can safely draw the conclusion that the 
most iconic images in language, i.e. the sounds of animals, are seemingly no less 
arbitrary than generally recognised arbitrary forms like house, cup or tree. We 
may think that it is only the context that makes a word meaningful and that there 
is nothing in the word or its form itself that would contribute to its meaning, and 
the above results seem to confirm the hypothesis. The student informants clearly 
referred to the knowledge of their mother tongue (see kra kra or bau bau), and 
gave  priority  to  the  forms  known.  One  may  conclude,  therefore,  that 
onomatopoeic  forms  are  so  strongly  arbitrary  that  they  have  to  be  learned 
individually, because the resemblance they bear (or not) to the objects they are 
supposed to designate cannot be associated by people even with some linguistic 
knowledge for whom the different phonological systems onomatopoeic forms are  
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put in is no obstacle. If one considers the sounds made by a dog such as, for 
example, English /wuf/ or /bau wau/, Polish /hau hau/, Italian /bau bau/ and 
Ukrainian /haf haf/, there seem to be no constraints in the phonological systems 
of these languages that would prevent a dog from barking uniformly, for instance 
/bau bau/ or /vau vau/. The fact that barking is represented differently in each 
language supports the thesis that those forms are arbitrary. 
One may conclude that the superficial similarity of onomatopoeic forms in 
different  languages  is  very  often  caused  by  language  contact;  borrowings 
sometimes make up to 90% of vocabulary (e.g. in Albanian), and onomatopoeic 
expressions are not an exception that cannot be borrowed by another language. 
In Irish, for example, despite its rich history and literature, most animals produce 
sounds in the English way, though the orthography of animal sounds conforms to 
the  Irish  writing  system:  for  example,  dogs  bhuf  /wuf/  and  cows  mū  /mu:/. 
Borrowing of onomatopoeias can also be traced in the history of Polish: gong 
‘the sound of a gong’ appeared in Polish in 1900, in English it was present as 
early as 1600, and it was probably adopted from Malayan gong; furkać or furczeć 
‘flutter’ (from the sound of fluttering wings) was taken in from the Ukrainian 
furknúty, kwękać ‘grumble because of ill health’ was taken from the German 
kränkeln.  
The apparent relatedness of onomatopoeic formations in different languages is 
–  to  a  large  extent  –  also  generated  by  their  same  common  root.  In  Slavic 
languages  there  are  similar  onomatopoeic  forms:  Polish  mlaskać,  Slovak 
ml’askat’, Czech mlaskati, Bulgarian mljáskam and Slavonic mlásati all sound and 
mean almost the same (i.e., ‘smack, click’) because they have developed from one 
Slavic root *mlęskati/*mlĕskati. The same phenomenon can be traced in a number 
of verbal forms, like dzwonić ‘ring’, chichotać ‘giggle’, czkać ‘hiccup’, grzmieć 
‘thunder’,  piszczeć  ‘squeak,  squeal,  peep’. These  and  other  Polish  forms  have 
cognates  in  many  other  Slavic  languages  and  this is  due  to  the  fact  that  they 
originated from one Proto-Slavic onomatopoeic root: *zvę-ti (*zvьn-ěti), *χъχ- ъt-
a-ti, *skeuk-, *grę-ti- (*grъme-), *pisč-ě-ti (*pisči-) respectively.  
It can be safely assumed that the sound made by a duck has a common Indo-
European ancestor. Compare, for example, English and German quack quack, 
Catalan cuac cuac, Dutch kwak kwak, Croatian kva kva, Italian and Portuguese 
qua qua, Norwegian kvakk-kvakk, Swedish kvack kvack, Spanish cuac cuac, Irish 
vāc vāc, Welsh cwac cwac and some equivalents from other non-Indo-European 
languages  such  as  Hungarian  háp-háp,  Thai  gaab  gaab  (with  falling  tone), 
Japanese  gaagaa,  Hebrew  ga  ga  ga,  Estonian  prääks  prääks,  Chinese 
(Mandarin)  gua  gua.  It  is  well-documented  that  words  in  languages  that  are 
related genealogically are likely to bear some resemblance to one another and 
this applies not only to onomatopoeic formations but to other forms as well.
5 
 
5 Compare, for example, words for ‘mother’ and ‘night’ in various Indo-European languages.  
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Now let us turn our attention to another case of sound symbolism, that is to 
say  phonesthemes.  It  should  be  more  than  obvious  that  if  onomatopoeic 
expressions are arbitrary, which we hope to have given at least partial evidence 
of, then the other instances of sound symbolism (in which the form and meaning, 
according to the traditional approach, are less strongly related) are also totally 
arbitrary. An attempt will be made to explain why some clusters refer to some 
similar  idea,  e.g.  that  sl-  conveys  unpleasantness.  The  reasons  why 
phonesthemes can be vaguely analysable seem to be twofold. One is that they are 
derived from one and the same source, i.e. they have a common lexical ancestor, 
and the other is that they are simply accidental. We will look, for example, at the 
derivation of sound-to-light phonesthemes with the gl- cluster; for the sake of 
clarity it will be presented in the graph below: 
 
I.E. *ghlē-, *ĝhel-, *ghel- (gleam, glitter) 
 
enlargement of the base 
 
 




 Teut.  
*glim-              I.E. *ghleid 
glare glow gloaming 
 
 
           
 glisten  glister   glaze  glass                   
       glitter 
 
             glimmer  glim  glimpse     gleam 
 
In the derivation above, some intermediate stages, for example, I.E. *ghlōu 
> O.E. glowan > Mod.E. glow, have been left out in order to make the graph as 
intelligible as possible. As can be seen from the graph, words beginning with the 
gl- cluster can legitimately be said to pertain to luminosity because they are all 
derived  from  the  same  Indo-European  stem:  *ghlē-,  *ĝhel-,  *ghel-  (gleam, 
glitter). But this fact does not have any significance for speakers for they do not 
analyse  such  segments  as  meaningful  or  vaguely  meaningful  morphemes. 
Normally, speakers tend to look at such segments as indivisible entities because 
it takes somebody with an academic knowledge of English etymology and a  
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classical education to discern any relationship between forms like permit, remit, 
commit and admit or sedan, sedate, sedentary and sediment. In fact, mitt(ere) in 
Latin means ‘send’, ‘do’ and sed(ere) means ‘sit’, and at this point we should ask 
the question. Why are the segments -mit, sed-, -pter-, bibl-, -ceive, pred- not 
treated  as  instances  of  sound  symbolism?  After  all,  they  relate  to  certain 
concepts,  viz.  ‘sending’,  ‘sitting’,  ‘winged’,  ‘bookish’,  ‘taking’,  and  ‘prey’ 
respectively.  The  answer  is  that  these  theoretically  ‘vaguely  analysable’ 
morphemes are not analysable at all by speakers whose access to synchronic 
information is part of their competence.  
As has already been pointed out, looking for sound symbolism in language 
is looking for regularities that do not seem to exist; the superficial similarity of 
forms is quite often superficial. Let us imagine, for example, the sound symbolic 
hypotheses that senses in Polish tend to end with a voiceless velar sound: węch 
/vęx/  ‘smell’,  wzrok  /vzrok/  ‘eyesight’,  słuch  /swux/  ‘hearing’,  smak  /smak/ 
‘taste’, dotyk /dotyk/ ‘touch’ or that names of parts of the body include vowel /o/: 
noga  ‘leg’,  stopa  ‘foot’, ucho  ‘ear’,  dłoń ‘palm’,  łokieć  ‘elbow’, nos  ‘nose’, 
kolano ‘knee’, udo ‘thigh’, oko ‘eye’, włosy ‘hair’, kostka ‘ankle’, biodro ‘hip’, 
policzek ‘cheek’. At first sight the hypotheses seems to work fine but at a closer 
look there would be few who would not consider it ridiculous. It is crystal-clear 
that such a type of convergence is thoroughly fortuitous or, as it has been shown 
earlier, etymologically explainable; recognition of a common source very often 
depends on how deep into the past we are able to look. Nevertheless, even if the 
common origin of some words can be traced, there is not much synchronic value 
in this because phonesthematic clusters are neither productive nor analysable. If 
someone called you a swindler, swine or swoer and you did not know the word 
you definitely would not think that you are smooth in moving. 
Apart  from  this,  one  should  remember  that  languages  employ  a  finite 
number of phonemes by means of which they can convey an enormous number 
of meanings. It should be understandable that the same sounds may appear in 
one semantic field (see the Polish /o/ in the semantic field PARTS OF THE 
BODY) and that this coincidence of forms is caused by a limited number of 
phonemes employed by a language and it is not difficult to find patterns which 
seem to exist but that are, in fact, fortuitous. Having provided some evidence that 
onomatopoeia  as  well  as  other  instances  of  sound  symbolism  are  based  on 
arbitrary ground, but bearing in mind that onomatopoeia as such is a very useful 
term, especially in literature, we would like to suggest a new definition of it: 
onomatopoeia  should  be  understood  as  a  class  of  words  referring  to 
imitation of sounds of nature with no iconic relationship. If a nonce formation 
pedomatopoeia was a general term for different kinds of walking, e.g., crawling, 
hobbling, marching, staggering, tiptoeing, dashing, limping, rambling, strolling, 
wandering,  etc.,  the  correlation  between  onomatopoeic  forms  and  the  actual 
sounds  of  nature  could  be  explained  on  the  bases  of  analogy  between  
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pedomatopoeia and actual ways of walking, or the term reptiles and real animals 
which  fall  under  this  category.  Such  terminology  may  be  useful  for  mere 
categorisation but it does not have any relevance for linguistic theory. 
Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  submitted  partial  evidence  that  onomatopoeic 
expressions  as  well  as  other  instances  of  sound  symbolism  are  no  more  than 
terminological  inventions  which  seem  to  have  no  relevance  in  any  theory  of 
language.  We  made  an  attempt  to  show  that  the  behaviour  of  onomatopoeic 
formations is by no means different from that of other ‘arbitrary’ forms: by the 
same token onomatopoeias are subject to the same phonological changes as non-
onomatopoeic  words  (e.g.  hnægð,  blǽt,  grunað).  Moreover,  onomatopoeic 
expressions  appear  to  undergo  exactly  the  same  kinds  of  semantic  change  as 
unmotivated ones. Broadening of meaning may be exemplified by the semantic 
evolution of Polish pikać and gruchać; the process of narrowing of meaning can be 
observed in the history of Polish gęgać, huczeć, piać as well as English croon and 
bray; meaning shift in onomatopoeias can be illustrated through the history of such 
English lexical items as bawl, chuckle, hip, jangle, jargon and Polish grzechotać. 
The  results  of  our  survey  confirm  the  thesis  that  traditionally  perceived 
onomatopoeic formations are as arbitrary as any other unmotivated words in a 
language  and  that  it  is  only  context  that  gives  meaning  to  an  ‘onomatopoeic’ 
expression.  However  expressive  ‘onomatopoeic’  words,  if  a  context  is  not 
provided, may mean virtually anything in every possible language. Onomatopoeias 
require the same linguistic knowledge as any other word in a given language: 
every  single  word  has  to  be  learned  individually  and  the  fact  that  words  are 
arbitrary is one of the reasons why languages are different. 
It  seems  that  the  superficial  similarity  of  onomatopoeic  forms  can  be 
explained  in  two  possible  ways;  one  is  brought  about  by  language  contact: 
‘onomatopoeic’ formations, just like other words, can be borrowed by languages, 
see Irish bhuf, mū and Polish gong, furkać and kwękać; the other reason for 
onomatopoeias being similar in different languages is their common ancestral 
root, e.g. mlaskać, dzwonić, chichotać, czkać. The apparent similarity of sound 
symbolic  clusters  can  also  be  justified  twofold:  one  is  the  same  as  in 
onomatopoeia, viz. etymological relatedness, e.g. glare, glow, etc., the other is 
their mere accidentallity.
6 The assumption that there is no sound symbolism (and 
–  accordingly  –  onomatopoeia)  in  language  adds  to  the  universality  of 
Sausurrean dichotomy signifé vs. signifiant which, in turn, leads to a greater 
uniformity in the theory of language. Finally, our paper seems to provide some 
 
6 See the senses and parts of the body in Polish.  
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vindication of the panchronic perspective in language analysis; only when we 
allow historical information (phonological changes, semantic changes) into our 
analysis are we able to throw some light on the spurious nature of onomatopoeia. 
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